There =
is
no word or a single sentence in the English language to describe what Major
General Kazin did to the Congolees people and children! Let there be no doubt about under whose supervision thi=
s on
slaughter was conducted, this was carried out under the direct orders of his
commander in chief Genaral Yoweri Kaguta Museven, the current iron fist rul=
er
of the republic of Uganda. We have confirmed reports by our trusted sources
that beheading, maiming women and children and shooting to kill people in b=
oth
northern Uganda and Congo was Museven’s tactical idea. He then instru=
cted
his tenacious military officer, at the time Maj. Gen. Kazin to implement the
unwavering massacre and the trick which successfully, worked was to shift t=
he
blame on the rebel commander Kony!!!
Ladies and gentlemen we stand by this reporting and if Museven or an=
y of
his defenders has a different version of what you are about to see, please
contact us..
May his soul rot in hell!!
War Criminal James Kazini
Victims of Maj Gen James Kazini
Victims of Maj Gen James Kazini
Victims of Maj Gen James Kazini
Mass-scale looting
<=
/span>War criminal, James Kazini
32.Between September 1998 and August 1999, occupied zone=
s of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo were drained of existing stockpiles,
including minerals, agricultural and forest products and livestock. Regardl=
ess
of the looter, the pattern was the same: Burundian, Rwandan, Ugandan and/or=
RCD
soldiers, commanded by an officer, visited farms, storage facilities, facto=
ries
and banks, and demanded that the managers open the coffers and doors. The
soldiers were then ordered to remove the relevant products and load them in=
to
vehicles. The Panel received numerous accounts and claims of unlawful remov=
al
of products by Rwandan or Ugandan armies and their local RCD allies. The Pa=
nel
has chosen to illustrate this point with some examples.
33. In the mining sector, SOMINKI (Société
minière et industrielle du Kivu) had seven years’ worth of
columbo-tantalite (coltan) in stock in various areas. From late November 19=
98,
Rwandan forces and their RCD allies organized its removal and transport to
Kigali. Depending on the sources, between 2,000 and 3,000 tons of cassiteri=
te
and between 1,000 and 1,500 tons of coltan were removed from the region bet=
ween
November 1998 and April 1999. A very reliable source informed the Panel tha=
t it
took the Rwandans about a month to fly this coltan to Kigali. The Panel,
however, received official documents including one in which RCD acknowledged
removing 6 tons of coltan and 200 tons of cassiterite from SOMINKI for a to=
tal
of US$ 722,482.
34. Late in late August 1998, General Kazini’s
soldiers absconded with the stockpiles of timber belonging to the logging
company Amex-bois, located in Bagboka. In December that year, the same Gene=
ral
ordered the confiscation of all the stocked timber belonging to the logging
company La Forestière. General Kazini was reportedly seen in the are=
a at
least twice during the period when the looting occurred and temporarily
established his headquarters in the area.
35. Then, in January 1999, in Equateur Province, Jean-Pi=
erre
Bemba and General Kazini organized a large operation for the confiscation of
coffee beans. Mr. Bemba initiated, encouraged and perpetuated such practice=
s in
the Province. In a written letter to one of his commanders, he urged him to
release a bigger vehicle he was using because it was needed urgently. The
source indicated that this was later used to carry away tons of coffee bean=
s. A
participant in this operation, who has since left the movement, explained t=
hat
two months were required to remove the enormous quantities of coffee. In the
past, this province produced 60 per cent of the country’s robusta cof=
fee.
The localities of Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and Mindembo for a year did=
not
have coffee stocks to export because of these seizures. The
Société congolaise du café, the largest owner of coffee
stocks in the area, went bankrupt. The mass-scale looting reached such leve=
ls
that, in one instance, Mr. Bemba seized 200 tons of coffee beans from the S=
CIBE
company, which was owned by his father, Saolona Bemba. The matter remains
unresolved in court.
36. In some cases, factories were dismantled or machinery
spare parts were taken away, as in the case of the sugar factory of Kaliba =
in
South Kivu. When the Panel asked about the dismantling of some factories, t=
he
RCD cabinet replied that investors were free to dismantle their factories a=
nd
relocate wherever they wanted. In essence, RCD recognized the phenomenon, b=
ut
explained it in terms of the investors’ decision to relocate the
factories while taking the raw materials from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Cars and other items were apparently also taken from the country, as
statistics on Ugandan registered cars reflected an increase of about one
quarter in 1999.
37. The financial sector was not left untouched either. A
defector from RCD who participated in some looting informed the Panel that
Rwandan soldiers systematically targeted local banks as soon as they conque=
red
a town. In many cases, they would use the RCD soldiers to collect the money
while those who were armed would surround the bank. For example, the Kisang=
ani
Bank, a branch of the central bank, received a visit of RCD staff accompani=
ed
by Rwandan soldiers. Depending on the source (central bank in Kinshasa or
eyewitness), anywhere between $1 million and $8 million worth of Congolese
francs was taken. The Panel was told that the operation took place a couple=
of
days after the central bank and Ministry of Finance officials deposited mon=
ey
to pay civil servants and old Congolese franc notes were replaced by new on=
es.
38. Under the escort of soldiers, the money was taken to=
the
Palm Beach Hotel. The hotel management recalled that bags full of money were
stored in one of the rooms and that during those few days armed soldiers who
could not speak Lingala (the most commonly spoken Congolese language) guard=
ed
the hotel premises. Could such an operation involving a number of armed
soldiers be carried out without the knowledge and consent of the highest
Rwandan commander in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
39. Aides of Jean-Pierre Ondekane (an RCD leader) report=
edly
collected the money from the Palm Beach Hotel, flew with it to Goma and han=
ded
it over to Emmanuel Kamanzi (former chief of the Finance Department of RCD),
who then flew on to Kigali. The Panel could not identify the final recipien=
t of
the money or how much disappeared between Kisangani, Goma and Kigali. Howev=
er,
some sources told the Panel that Mr. Kamanzi was imprisoned briefly at some
point after this transaction. According to the same sources, he had apparen=
tly
helped himself to the money he was ordered only to transport. Mr. Kamanzi t=
old
friends that he simply took a break of two months in Kigali.
40. During the period when this operation was under way,=
in
Equateur Province, Mr. Bemba’s men visited several banks. According t=
o a
reliable source Mr. Bemba’s instructions to his soldiers were to
systematically empty the bank once a town was captured. His troops took an
equivalent of $400,000 from the Banque commerciale du Congo branch in Bumba,
$500,000 in Lisala, and approximately $600,000 in Gemena.
41. The pilfering was also occurring in Kinshasa. The Pa=
nel
has evidence of a widespread practice by which the late President Kabila wo=
uld
by proxy have companies give a certain percentage of their profits. For
example, certain oil companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, und=
er
the umbrella of taxe parafiscale, were delivering sums of money, in hard ca=
sh,
daily or weekly to the late President via his Minister, friend and right-ha=
nd
man, Mr. Mpoyo. Other companies, such as MIBA, were asked to hand over part=
of
their profits to the late President’s regime, and all parastatals and
important private companies were invited to open bank accounts in the Banqu=
e de
commerce et du développement (BCD) (see para. 78).
42. However, over time the mass-scale looting described
above diminished and theft by individual soldiers became more visible. For
example, in Bunia, during Panel discussions, local non-governmental
organizations, eyewitnesses and victims mentioned cases in which Congolese
civilians were injured or murdered for resisting the attempted seizure of
property by the RCD rebels and foreign soldiers. In Bukavu, individuals have
told Panel members how Rwandan soldiers confiscated their life savings in
dollar notes and some of the gold they were buying and keeping as monnaie
refuge in the face of the repeatedly devalued Congolese franc. Partially, t=
his
has contributed to the increasing resentment felt by the Congolese populati=
on
towards foreign soldiers and some rebels.
43. The looting of manufacturing plants, stocks and priv=
ate
property were not only acts of isolated individual soldiers but were
encouraged, sometimes organized and coordinated, by the highest army comman=
ders
of both Rwanda and Uganda.
44. General Kazini used the same method to facilitate
looting activities. He would appoint loyal commanders and reliable civilian
Congolese in the civil administration in areas potentially rich in natural
resources in order to secure his networks. This was exactly the case in Itu=
ri,
where he appointed Adele Lotsove in 1999 (see para. 71). In turn, these top
layers of collaborators, colonels and majors utilized their right-hand men =
to
carry out the actual looting.
45. The Panel has strong indications after talking to
numerous witnesses (key and others) that key officials in the Governments o=
f Rwanda
and Uganda were aware of the situation on the ground, including the looting=
of
stocks from a number of factories. In some cases, the level of production of
mineral resources would have alerted any government, such as those of gold =
for
Uganda and coltan for Rwanda (from 99 tons in 1996 to 250 tons in 1997).