

Ugandans to the rescue



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Using the “Word” to kill and rob



Murder in the name of religion!

Why is Museveni so desperate to hold onto power that he has discarded any pretence about having a political message and instead has turned to naked, unabashed use of money to buy votes and "support"?

First, Museveni has over the years made the sorts of enemies who have marked him out for assassination. Whether he is head of state or a retired president, he will be hunted down by these enemies. Remaining in power, then, is his only guarantee of personal safety.

The *Uganda Record* has in recent days chronicled reports of plans by Rwanda to eliminate Museveni, the First Lady Janet Museveni, Museveni's brother Gen. Salim Saleh and an army General, Gen. David Tinnyefuza.

The 2009 U.S. State Department cables published by the WikiLeaks website, in which Museveni expressed his worry about Libya's leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi assassinating him, lend further credence to the mortal danger facing Museveni.

Secondly, over the years the Museveni family has amassed wealth of a kind that will someday require a film to capture.

This wealth was accumulated by the brazen plundering of minerals and timber in the Democratic Republic of Congo, stealing Ugandan embassy and Coffee Marketing Board land in Mombasa, Kenya, stealing money intended for new planes for Uganda Airlines in 1992, selling off the old places of the defunct Uganda Airlines in 1997, laundering money through various offshore companies and bank accounts and a whole host of other ways.

Museveni today is easily the richest person in Uganda, now about richer than even the legendary Madhvani family of Kakira near Jinja.

From Museveni's point of view, to lose the presidency would be tantamount to more than just losing a job;

HELP IS ON THE WAY

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it would be the equivalent to being evicted off one's land or from one's home. Uganda has become Sugar Candy Mountain for the Museveni family.

To protect this ill-gotten wealth, Museveni now has the greatest interest in stability and the *status quo*. Things must continue as they are or his fall from tremendous wealth back to the haunting poverty of his childhood becomes a complete circle.

He has no choice now but to work night and day for the consolidation of his son Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba's hold on the army and acquisition of political experience. However, Kainerugaba is deeply resented in the army and has, for the time being, no political base to speak of.

The efforts by Museveni to advance Kainerugaba in the army only deepen this resentment, which in turn increases Museveni's paranoia.

But in all this, the bottom line fact for Museveni is that to lose power would be catastrophe. It is unthinkable. If Ugandans can no longer vote for him out of belief in him, then perhaps they can be persuaded to vote for him out of their own selfish gain.

If their selfish interest in piles of free money, then piles of free money will be given to them. If the *Uganda Record* requires 100,000 dollars to bribe it to stop exposing his scandalous presidency and personal life, then find the *Uganda Record* 100,000 dollars.

If it were possible to bribe his main challenger, Col. Kiiza Besigye, Museveni would do so.

Do what has to be done, is the real theme of the 2010 and 2011 Museveni election campaign.

This recourse to all-out use of money, of parading leading political figures who are supposedly endorsing Museveni demonstrates the vulnerability, not the strength, of Museveni in 2011.

He is faced with an existential fight of his life.

The Ugandan opposition, meanwhile, is also determined that this time they will not allow Museveni to get away with rigging and they will dismiss the usual western diplomatic endorsement of a Museveni "win".

Museveni is not going to concede defeat even when --- not if --- he is defeated. The opposition is now confident and defiant enough not to give in easily.

Result? The Feb. 18, 2011 Ugandan general election, because of all these factors, is going to be messy. It is going to end up in a situation halfway between the part calm, part violent aftermath of the recent election run-off in Ivory Coast and the civil war-like violence that followed the Kenyan election in Dec. 2007.

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